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Abstract
Recent models with liquidity constraints and impatience emphasize that consumers use savings
to buffer income fluctuations. When wealth is below an optimal target, consumers try to increase
their buffer stock of wealth by saving more. When it is above target, they increase consumption.
This important implication of the buffer stock model of saving has not been subject to direct
empirical testing. We derive from the model an appropriate theoretical restriction and test
it using data on working-age individuals drawn from the 2002 and 2004 Italian Surveys of
Household Income and Wealth. One of the most appealing features of the survey is that it has
data on the amount of wealth held for precautionary purposes, which we interpret as target
wealth in a buffer stock model. The test results do not support buffer stock behavior, even
among population groups that are more likely, a priori, to display such behavior. The saving
behavior of young households is instead consistent with models in which impatience, relative
to prudence, is not as high as in buffer stock models. (JEL: D91)
1. Introduction
Recent intertemporal consumption models emphasize the role of savings as a
buffer stock against income fluctuations. Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) have
solved sophisticated versions of such models. Although the specific details of the
models differ, emphasizing liquidity constraints or the probability of low income
realizations, they share similar predictions. In both models, consumers have a
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unique and stable ratio between cash on hand (wealth plus disposable income)
and the permanent component of income, which we term the “target wealth to
permanent income ratio.” As stated by Carroll, buffer-stock savers have a target
wealth to permanent income ratio “such that if [actual] wealth is below the target,
the precautionary saving motive will dominate impatience, and the consumer
will save, while if [actual] wealth is above the target, impatience will dominate
prudence, and the consumer will dissave” (p. 2).
This key implication of the buffer-stock saving model has not been subject
to empirical scrutiny. Current evidence of buffer-stock behavior is based on two
model’s implications: that consumption tracks income closely, and that precau-
tionary saving represents an important reason for wealth accumulation. Several
simulations of intertemporal consumption models predict consumption-income
tracking in the early part of the life-cycle (Attanasio et al. 1999; Laibson, Repetto
and Tobacman 1998; Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003). Empirical evi-
dence on the importance of precautionary saving is mostly based on reduced form
regressions of net worth or financial assets on proxies for income risk. Some stud-
ies report that precautionary wealth represents a small portion of total wealth, e.g.
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1992), and Hurst, Lusardi et al. (2005); others
find a large impact of income risk e.g., Carroll and Samwick (1997), and Gruber
and Yelowitz (1999). These studies differ in many respects, such as the definition
of wealth, the measure of risk, and institutional features. But even findings of
large effects of income risk on saving are not conclusive evidence of buffer stock
behavior, because life-cycle models with income risk also provide an important
role for precautionary saving (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995). In short,
the literature still lacks a convincing test of the buffer-stock model.
In this paper we use a survey question on precautionary wealth available in
the 2002 and 2004 Bank of Italy Surveys on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) to propose a direct test of buffer stock behavior. The question asks
people how much savings they think they need for future emergencies, and is
similar to a question contained in the 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer
Finances described in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004). We interpret this ques-
tion as providing information on target wealth in a buffer-stock model and test
the proposition that people with a ratio of actual wealth to permanent income
below the target intend to save, whereas those with a ratio above target intend to
dissave.
Although we focus on Carroll’s (1991) version of the buffer stock model, the
test applies equally well to Deaton’s (1997) case. In Carroll, buffer stock behavior
emerges from the tension between impatience, prudence, and the chance of zero
earnings. Impatient individuals would like to anticipate consumption, but the
chance of zero future earnings generates a demand for wealth. In Deaton, there
is an explicit liquidity constraint, but the insights are similar, and buffer-stock
behavior emerges again as the optimal policy.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives our test of
the buffer stock model, and evaluates it with simulated data. The test can be
used to check whether or not buffer stock behavior is rejected by the data, and
relies on a specific survey question on precautionary wealth. Section 3 describes
such a question and compares it with a similar question asked in the U.S. Survey
of Consumer Finances. The test results, presented in Section 4, are inconsistent
with the buffer stock model. In Section 5 we therefore present estimates of the
age–wealth profile obtained with Italian repeated cross-sectional data to provide
further evidence on the validity of the buffer-stock model. In particular, the model
suggests that the ratio of wealth to permanent income of young consumers should
be stationary, whereas models in which prudence dominates impatience suggest
that the ratio grows even in young ages because consumers save for retirement. In
addition this evidence runs contrary to the predictions of the buffer-stock model.
Section 6 summarizes our findings.
2. Deriving Testable Implications of Buffer-Stock Behavior
We take as our point of departure Carroll’s (1997) buffer-stock saving model to
derive testable predictions and explain our empirical strategy. Consumers have
finite horizons and choose consumption to maximize the following objective
function:
E0
T∑
t=0
βtu(Ct ),
where β is the subjective discount factor, the instantaneous utility function is
isoelastic, u(Ct ) = C1−ρt /(1 − ρ), and ρ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. The dynamic budget constraint is
Wt+1 = R[Wt − Ct + Yt ],
where R = 1 + r is the constant interest rate factor, and Wt , Yt , and Ct are,
respectively, non-human wealth, labor income, and consumption at time t . Labor
income shifts due to transitory and permanent shocks, assumed to be log-normally
distributed, namely,
Yt+1 = Pt+1Vt+1, (1)
Pt+1 = GPtNt+1, (2)
where G is the growth rate of income, Pt+1 is permanent income, and Vt+1 and
Nt+1 are i.i.d. shocks with mean equal to 1.1 The model also assumes that in each
1. More precisely, Pt+1 is the permanent component of income. We use the two terms
interchangeably.
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period there is a small chance p > 0 that transitory income is zero. The Bellman
equation of the problem is
Vt(Wt , Pt ) = max
Ct
u(Ct ) + βEtVt+1(Wt+1, Pt+1) (3)
subject to: Pt+1 = GPtNt+1,
Wt+1 = R[Wt − Ct + Yt ].
To exploit the homogeneity of the instantaneous utility function, let’s define
cash-on-hand Xt as the sum of non-human wealth and income (Xt = Wt + Yt ),
and write question (3) as
vt (xt ) = max
ct
u(ct ) + βEtG1−ρN1−ρt+1 vt+1(xt+1) (4)
subject to: xt+1 = R[xt − ct ] 1
GNt+1
+ Vt+1, (5)
where ct = Ct/Pt , vt (xt ) = Vt(Wt , Yt )/P 1−ρt , and xt = (Wt + Yt )/Pt is what
we call, for brevity, “wealth to permanent income ratio.”2
Carroll (2004) shows that for specific ranges of parameter values, the problem
has a solution (i.e., the functional defined in equation (4) has a fixed point),
optimal consumption is an increasing and concave function of cash on hand,
and the marginal propensity to consume out of cash on hand is bounded from
above and from below. Furthermore, there exists a unique and stable value of
x (which we call x∗ and term, again for brevity, “target wealth to permanent
income ratio”) such that, “if actual wealth is greater than the target, impatience
will outweigh prudence, and wealth will fall, while if wealth is below the target,
the precautionary saving motive will outweigh impatience and the consumer will
try to build wealth back up toward to target” (Carroll 2001, p. 33).3 In our notation,
if (xt − x∗) < 0, then xt grows in expectation. If instead (xt − x∗) > 0, xt falls
(again, in expectation). Using cross-section data, we construct a test of the theory
based on this crucial insight.
At any given point in time, households differ in their value of the wealth gap
(xt − x∗). A first source of heterogeneity concerns preferences and the parame-
ters of the income-generating process, which set different values of x∗ for each
individual. Income shocks are a second source of heterogeneity: Even if two
identical consumers have the same preferences and the same income-generating
2. This is to avoid the rather cumbersome terminology of “ratio of cash-on-hand to the permanent
component of income.”
3. Carroll (2004) shows also that, at the target, expected consumption growth is less than expected
permanent income growth and that expected consumption growth is declining in cash on hand.
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process—and therefore the same x∗—they receive different income shocks and
have therefore different xt and wealth gaps.4
Thus in a cross-section, the model implies that
Cov
(
xht − x∗h, Eht (xht+1 − xht )
)
< 0, (6)
where Cov(·, ·) is a population covariance and h is a household index. This nota-
tion makes explicit that Eht (xht+1 − xht ) is the time–t expectation of household
h’s next period change in the wealth–permanent income ratio, and the covariance
is taken with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of the wealth gap and of
expected asset accumulation.
To use equation (6) as a basis for an empirical test, one needs to observe
x∗h , xht and Eht (xht+1). As we shall see, we have data on actual wealth and on a
proxy of target wealth, but not on the expected value of the change in the wealth–
permanent income ratio xht . To evaluate Eht (xt+1), let’s take the expectation
as of time t of equation (5) for household h, and recall that Eht (Nt+1) = 1,
Eht (Vt+1) = 1, and Varht (ln Nt+1) = σ 2N :
Eht (xht+1) = R[xht − cht ] × Eht
(
1
GNt+1
)
+ EhtVht+1
≈ R
G
[xht − cht ] × eσ 2N + 1, (7)
where the second equality follows from a second-order Taylor expansion of
1/Nht+1 around the mean of Nht+1.
Substituting equation (7) in equation (6) and defining γ = eσ 2N , we can restate
equation (6) in terms of observable variables as
θ = Cov
(
xht − x∗h, cht
)
Cov
(
xht − x∗h, xht
) >
(
1 − G
Rγ
)
. (8)
The sign of θ (which from now on we term the “covariance ratio”) is a priori
ambiguous. In fact, σN > 0 implies γ > 1. If the growth rate of income is lower
than the interest rate (G < R) the covariance ratio is a positive number. However,
if G > R the covariance ratio must exceed a negative number, and so it might
itself be negative. In the buffer stock model both cases might arise. Indeed, Carroll
(1997) shows that the parameters must satisfy the following inequality:
r − δ
ρ
+ ρ
2
σ 2N < g −
1
2
σ 2N, (9)
where ln R ≈ r , ln β ≈ −δ, and ln G ≈ g.
4. These are not the only possible sources of heterogeneity. In Section 2.2 we use simulation
analysis to explore the effect of heterogeneity in income risk, income growth, and interest rates.
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2.1. Test Interpretation and Implementation
Our test strategy is as follows. First note that the sample analog of the left-hand
side of the inequality (8) is
θˆ = Cov
(
xh − x∗h, ch
)
Cov
(
xh − x∗h, xh
) =
∑H
h=1
((
xh − x∗h
)− (xh − x∗h))(ch − ch)∑H
h=1
((
xh − x∗h
)− (xh − x∗h))(xh − xh)
,
where we have dropped the time subscripts, Cov(·, ·) is a sample covariance,
and a bar over a variable denotes its cross-sectional mean. This is simply the
instrumental variables (IV) estimate of a regression of ch on xh using the wealth
gap (xh−x∗h) as an instrument. The advantage of the regression framework is that
it naturally delivers standard errors which allow us to conduct statistical inference
on the value of θ .
There are two ways to test the implications of the buffer-stock model underly-
ing equation (8) (and hence equation (6)). One way would be to choose values of
G,R, and γ and test whether θˆ satisfies the bound restriction implied by equation
(8). The problem with this strategy is that the bound restriction may be satisfied
for implausible values of the parameters. Instead, our test strategy is based on
the comparison between the empirical and theoretical values of θ . Because we
don’t know the true parameters, we simulate the buffer-stock model for a variety
of plausible parameter configurations. In particular, we explore cases in which
G < R, as well as cases in which individuals expect high earnings growth relative
to the interest rate (G > R). Finally, we compare the estimated with the simulated
covariance ratio.
2.2. The Simulated Covariance Ratio
To implement our test, we start by simulating the model for an economy popu-
lated by heterogeneous consumers. In the baseline scenario, we posit two sources
of heterogeneity. Each individual has a different discount factor, uniformly dis-
tributed between 0.86 and 0.96. This guarantees that each consumer has different
target wealth. Secondly, although in the baseline scenario the income process is
the same, in each period consumers are hit by different realizations of the shocks.
We set the other models’ parameters following Carroll (2004): the growth
factor G = 1.03, the interest rate factor R = 1.04, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion ρ = 2, the standard deviation of permanent and transitory income
shocks σN = σV = 0.1, and the probability of unemployment p = 0.005. Such
parametrization satisfies equation (9) and guarantees a stationary target wealth to
permanent income ratio x∗.
We assume that consumers start with zero wealth and simulate the model
for 100 periods and 1,000 consumers. We then compute, for each consumer, the
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Figure 1. Simulated target wealth to permanent income ratio. The figure plots the target wealth
to permanent income ratio (x∗) as a function of the discount factor β. The target wealth ratios are
obtained simulating the buffer stock model with the baseline parameters G = 1.03, R = 1.04,
ρ = 2, σN = 0.1, σV = 0.1, and p = 0.005.
target wealth to permanent income ratio such that Eht (xht+1) = xht . In Figure 1
we plot the cross-sectional distribution of target wealth against the intertemporal
discount rate β for the 1,000 buffer stock consumers of our simulations. The
figure highlights the positive association between the discount factor and the target
wealth to permanent income ratio: x∗h increases from about 1.2 for β = 0.86 to
1.45 for β = 0.96.
Based on the different values of x∗h and different realizations of xht and cht ,
we compute in each of the 100 periods the cross-sectional covariance ratios, and
summarize its distribution by the median value. For the baseline experiment we
find a simulated θ = 0.62.5
It is important to check that the simulated θ does not depend heavily on
the specific parametrization of the model. Therefore we simulate the covariance
ratio under a wide range of alternative, realistic parameter assumptions. Table 1
reports the simulated θ for different parameter values and sources of individual
heterogeneity, separately for the case G < R (Panel A) and G > R (Panel B).
Each parametrization satisfies condition (9) and is obtained from the baseline
case by varying one parameter at the time.
5. The 25th and 75th percentiles of the simulated covariance ratio are 0.61 and 0.63, respectively.
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Table 1. The simulated covariance ratio.
Panel A: G < R
Growth factor Covariance ratio θ Interest rate factor Covariance ratio θ
G = 1.025 0.605 R = 1.035 0.632
G = 1.035 0.641 R = 1.045 0.616
G = [1.025, 1.035] 0.629 R = [1.035, 1.045] 0.617
Probability of zero income Relative risk aversion
p = 0.001 0.704 ρ = 1.5 0.669
p = 0.01 0.572 ρ = 4 0.452
p = [0.001, 0.01] 0.594 ρ = [1.5, 4] 0.513
S.D. of permanent shocks S.D. of transitory shocks
σN = 0.04 0.663 σV = 0.04 0.691
σN = 0.14 0.524 σV = 0.14 0.586
σN = [0.04, 0.14] 0.561 σV = [0.04, 0.14] 0.596
Panel B: G > R
Growth factor Covariance ratio θ Interest rate factor Covariance ratio θ
G = 1.035 0.654 R = 1.025 0.669
G = 1.045 0.675 R = 1.035 0.660
G = [1.035, 1.045] 0.672 R = [1.025, 1.035] 0.661
Probability of zero income Relative risk aversion
p = 0.001 0.688 ρ = 1.5 0.716
p = 0.01 0.624 ρ = 4 0.485
p = [0.001, 0.01] 0.645 ρ = [1.5, 4] 0.567
S.D. of permanent shocks S.D. of transitory shocks
σN = 0.04 0.731 σV = 0.04 0.757
σN = 0.14 0.625 σV = 0.14 0.615
σN = [0.04, 0.14] 0.644 σV = [0.04, 0.14] 0.643
Notes: The table reports the median simulated covariance ratio under alternative parameterization of a buffer-stock
economy populated by 1,000 individuals. In the baseline scenario of Panel A G = 1.03, R = 1.04, ρ = 2, σN = 0.1,
σV = 0.1, and p = 0.005, β ranges from 0.86 to 0.96, and the median simulated covariance ratio is θ = 0.623. In the
baseline scenario of Panel B, G = 1.04, R = 1.03, ρ = 2, σN = 0.1, σV = 0.1, and p = 0.005, β ranges from 0.86 to
0.96, and the median simulated covariance ratio is θ = 0.664.
Panel A shows that changing the growth factor to 1.025 or 1.035, and the
interest factor to 1.035 or 1.045 does not affect the covariance ratio appreciably,
while raising the coefficient of risk aversion to 4 reduces θ to 0.45. Changing
the income process has a larger impact on the ratio. For instance, lowering the
standard deviation of permanent or transitory income shocks to 0.04 raises the
covariance ratio to 0.66 and 0.69, respectively. Finally, the simulated θ increases
to 0.70 when the probability of unemployment is lowered to 0.1%. In all cases,
the simulated θ ranges from 0.45 to 0.7.
In Panel A we also compute the simulated covariance ratio under different
assumptions about the source of heterogeneity in the model. We consider cases
in which the growth factors are uniformly distributed between 1.025 and 1.035
(obtaining θ = 0.63), interest factors between 1.035 and 1.045 (θ = 0.62),
coefficients of relative risk aversion between 1.5 and 4 (θ = 0.51), standard
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deviations of permanent and transitory income shocks between 4% and 14%
(θ = 0.56 and θ = 0.60, respectively), and probabilities of zero income between
0.1% and 1% (θ = 0.59).
We then we repeat the simulations considering cases with G > R. In the
baseline scenario we set G = 1.04 and R = 1.03; the other parameters are the
same as in the baseline scenario withG < R (ρ = 2,σN = σV =0.1,p = 0.005).
The simulated covariance ratio in this case is equal to 0.66. In Panel B we consider
the same sources of heterogeneity as in Panel A. Each of the experiments assumes
G > R, and satisfies condition (9). The simulated covariance ratios range from
0.48 to 0.76.
Finally, we compute θ choosing parameter values that fit the Italian economy.
In the past two decade the productivity growth rates of Italian workers in the age
group 20–50 has been 1.5%, and the real interest rate 2.5%; accordingly, we set
G = 1.015 and R = 1.025. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) estimate the income
process (equations (1)–(2)) with Italian panel data and find standard deviations of
permanent and transitory income shocks of 0.16 and 0.28, respectively. For such
parameterization, θ equals 0.46.
We conclude from these experiments that in realistically calibrated buffer
stock models the covariance ratio is likely to be in the 0.5–0.6 range, and unlikely
to fall below 0.4 or to exceed 0.8. Any empirical estimate of θ that is statistically
significantly away from this range would therefore be hard to reconcile with
buffer-stock behavior.
3. Data
To implement the empirical test of the buffer-stock model, we use the 2002 and
2004 Italian Surveys of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). SHIW is a bian-
nual representative sample of the Italian population conducted by the Bank of
Italy.6 In each year, the sample includes about 8,000 households and 24,000 indi-
viduals. Details on the questionnaire, sample design, response rates, results, and
comparison of survey data with macroeconomic data are given in Biancotti et al.
(2004) and Faiella et al. (2006).7
For our purposes, the SHIW has several advantages. It has data on wealth,
income, consumption, and detailed demographic characteristics of the household.
6. In the buffer-stock model, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is high because consumers
are impatient. Carroll (2001) interprets the excess sensitivity of consumption found by Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) and Jappelli and Pagano (1989) in time series data for several OECD countries,
and in Italy in particular, as dependent on the prevalence of impatient households. He argues that in
these countries there are “more households who are impatient and consequently inhabit the portion
of the consumption function where the MPC is high, whether they are formally constrained or not”
(Carroll, 2001, p. 38). Italy, therefore, provides a good testing ground for the buffer-stock model.
7. The SHIW started in 1977, but data on consumption have been collected only since 1984.
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Net financial assets measure the liquid portion of wealth, and are the sum of trans-
action accounts, government bonds, CDs, corporate bonds, retirement accounts,
life insurance, and stocks, less household debt (mortgage loans, consumer credit,
and other personal loans). Total assets are the sum of net financial assets and real
assets (real estate, unincorporated business holdings, valuables and art objects).
The SHIW also includes a rotating panel component: in each year, about 45% of
the households are also interviewed two years later. We will later use the panel
section of the SHIW to recover individual-level variables available only in the
2000 survey and to assess the robustness of our results in the presence of fixed
effects.
Most importantly for the present study, the 2002 and 2004 SHIW have a
direct question on precautionary wealth, which we use to proxy target wealth in
the buffer stock model:
People save in various ways (depositing money in a bank account, buying
financial assets, property, or other assets) and for different reasons. A first
reason is to prepare for a planned event, such as the purchase of a house,
children’s education, etc. Another reason is to protect against contingencies,
such as uncertainty about future earnings or unexpected outlays (owing to
health problems or other emergencies). About how much do you think you
and your family need to have in savings to meet such unexpected events?
The question is patterned after a similar question in the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), described in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004).8
Table 2 reports sample means and quartiles of target wealth for various sample
groups, pooling data for 2002 and 2004. The median value of target wealth is
25,000, and the mean is 55,137. Interestingly, these values are considerably
higher than in the United States, where Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) report that
the bulk of the distribution of target wealth is between $US5,000 and $US10,000.
Target wealth is higher among high-school and college graduates, self-employed,
households with multiple income recipients, and households living in the North.
The median ratio of target wealth to total wealth is 0.31, and 3.32 if wealth
includes only financial assets. These numbers are higher than in Kennickell
and Lusardi (2004), who report 0.08 and 0.2, respectively. This shows that in
Italy precautionary wealth potentially accounts for a larger portion of wealth,
possibly due to higher income risk or lower degree of development of finan-
cial and insurance markets. The Italian data also indicate that in 75% of the
8. The SCF question is: “About how much do you think you and your family need to have in savings
for unanticipated emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?” The question has
been extensively tested in the SCF with focus groups. Nevertheless, the question may be criticized
because some consumers might report what they wish to save rather than what they aim to save,
and because some may act “as if” they behave according to a buffer-stock model, even though they
have difficulty identifying what their target wealth–income ratio is. Because there are no objective
measures of target wealth, we cannot check whether these criticisms are founded.
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Table 2. Selected statistics for target wealth.
Number of
Mean First quartile Median Third quartile observations
20 ≤ age ≤ 30 47,661 9,429 23,572 47,143 617
30 < age ≤ 40 58,531 10,000 25,000 50,000 2,243
40 < age ≤ 50 57,022 10,000 28,285 52,000 3,051
Self-employed 69,350 15,000 47,143 94,286 1,078
Employee 51,967 10,000 25,000 50,000 4,833
Single earner 49,864 9,429 23,572 50,000 2,683
Multiple earners 60,302 10,000 28,286 60,000 3,228
North–Center 61,316 11,314 28,286 66,000 3,977
South 40,857 50,000 18,857 47,143 1,934
Entrepreneurs 69,399 14,143 40,000 94,286 1,209
Non-entrepreneurs 51,651 9,429 25,000 50,000 4,702
Low education 48,232 9,429 25,000 50,000 2,665
High education 61,447 10,000 28,286 60,000 3,246
Total sample 55,137 10,000 25,000 50,000 5,911
Notes: The table reports sample statistics of target wealth. The sample is obtained pooling the 2002 and 2004 SHIW.
Sample statistics are estimated using population weights. Values are expressed in 2002 euros.
cases financial wealth is below target, and in 28% of cases total wealth is
below target. Comparable figures for Kennickell and Lusardi are 48% and 17%,
respectively.
In the empirical application we measure consumption as non durable expendi-
tures.9 We define cash-on-hand asY+Wf +λWr , whereY is household disposable
income, Wf and Wr are, respectively, net financial assets and real assets, and
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 measures the portion of real assets that can be used in the current
period to finance consumption.10 We focus on a sample where buffer-stock behav-
ior is more likely to emerge, selecting households with heads aged between 20
and 50. The resulting sample consists of 5,911 observations (2,953 for 2002 and
2,958 for 2004).
Consumption, target wealth, cash-on-hand, and the wealth gap are all nor-
malized by an estimate of the permanent component of income, that is, income
during the working life purged from transitory components. We opt for a simple
and straightforward definition, and estimate the permanent component of income
by the fitted value of a regression of household non-financial income on age,
education, dummies for occupation, region of residence, head gender, number of
earners, and a year dummy.
Figure 2 plots the histogram of the target wealth to permanent income ratio.
The median ratio represents slightly more than one year of income, and the bulk
9. Results are unchanged if one defines consumption as the sum of non-durable and durable
expenditures, see Section 4.6.
10. Another reason to let λ vary is that the definition of cash-on-hand adds a flow (income) to a
stock (wealth).
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Figure 2. Target wealth to permanent income ratio. The figure plots the sample distribution of the
target wealth to permanent income ratio in the pooled 2002–2004 SHIW.
of the distribution is between 2 months and 6 years. Figure 3 reports the density
of the ratio splitting the sample by business ownership and number of income
recipients. The figure shows that the distribution of the ratio is higher for business
owners and single income households, which should indeed be the case if these
households face more uncertainty relative to the other groups.
Table 3 reports median regressions for the logarithm of target wealth, and for
the target wealth to permanent income ratio. In each case we control for the log
of permanent income. Because regional factors are quite important in Italy, and
might be correlated with background economic variables and preferences, we run
the two specifications including a full set of 20 regional dummies. The coefficient
estimates show that target wealth increases with age (slightly less than 1% for
each year) and education (between 2% and 3% per year). Business owners have
a target wealth that is about 20% higher than the reference group, confirming the
graphical comparison in Figure 3. Single-income households have a target wealth
that is about 10% higher, although the coefficient is not statistically different from
zero when we control for regional effects.
4. Testing the Buffer-Stock Model
In this section we estimate the covariance ratio θ and compare it with the simu-
lated values from Section 2.2. Recall that the simulated θ never falls below 0.4 or
exceeds 0.8. In this section we also test if θ differs by economic and demographic
characteristics of the household. We focus on households facing high income
risk (such as business owners, single-income households, the self-employed) and
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Figure 3. Target wealth to permanent income ratio, by business ownership and number of income
recipients. The figure plots the kernel density of the target wealth to permanent income ratio using
the pooled 2002–2004 SHIW by business ownership and number of income recipients.
Table 3. Regressions for target wealth.
Target wealth
Log target wealth to permanent income ratio
Age 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.004)** (0.003)***
Years of education 0.023 0.028 0.024 0.030
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Self-employed 0.029 0.047 0.017 0.031
(0.081) (0.080) (0.090) (0.082)
Business owners 0.216 0.210 0.229 0.260
(0.078)*** (0.076)*** (0.086)*** (0.078)***
Family size –0.006 0.050 –0.006 0.050
(0.018) (0.020)** (0.020) (0.020)**
Single income 0.142 0.071 0.171 0.081
(0.058)** (0.058) (0.064)*** (0.059)
Log permanent income 0.645 0.324 –0.367 –0.725
(0.071)*** (0.078)*** (0.078)*** (0.079)***
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports median regressions for the log of target wealth and the ratio of target wealth to permanent
income using the pooled 2002–2004 SHIW. The second and fourth regressions include a set of 20 regional dummies. The
permanent component of income is estimated by the fitted value of a regression of household non-financial income on
age, education, dummies for occupation, region of residence, head gender, and number of earners in the household and
year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4. Estimated covariance ratio: baseline regression and group estimates.
Y + λWr + Wf Number of
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.25 observations
Total sample 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.015
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 5,911
20 ≤ Age ≤ 30 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) 617
30 < Age ≤ 40 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 2,243
40 < Age ≤ 50 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 3,051
Self-employed 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 1,078
Employees 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 4,833
Single earners 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 2,683
Multiple earners 0.012 0.015 0.020 0.023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 3,228
North–Center 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.023
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 3,977
South 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 1,934
Entrepreneurs 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 1,209
Non-entrepreneurs 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 4,702
Low education 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 2,665
High education 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 3,246
Notes: The sample is based on the pooled 2002 and 2004 SHIW. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and financial wealth,
Y is disposable income, and λ is the share of real assets that can be used in the current period to finance consumption.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
impatient consumers (using a direct survey question on the rate of time prefer-
ence). Finally, we check robustness of our results to measurement error, different
definitions of income and consumption, and unobserved heterogeneity.
4.1. Baseline Estimates
The first row of Table 4 displays baseline estimates for the whole sample on the
pooled 2002–2004 sample. They are obtained regressing consumption on cash
on hand, using the wealth gap as an instrument. All variables are divided by our
estimate of the permanent component of income. In the first column, we set λ = 1
and cash on hand is just Y +Wf +Wr , on the assumption that households can use
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all assets to buffer income shocks. The point estimate of θ is 0.012, much lower
than the values consistent with buffer stock behavior. Because the estimate has
a small standard error, we formally reject the hypothesis that θ equals any one
of the simulated values of Table 2. Setting λ = {0.75, 0.50, 0.25}, we find that
θ ranges from 0.015 to 0.017, much below the range of admissible values of the
simulated ratio.
4.2. Group Estimates
Even if our baseline results do not support it, the buffer-stock model might still
characterize the behavior of some population groups that face high income volatil-
ity or are more impatient. We are particularly interested in detecting buffer-stock
behavior for groups that, a priori or based on previous evidence, are more likely
to exhibit such behavior. The self-employed clearly face greater income risk than
employees. If the incomes of households with multiple earners are not perfectly
correlated, single income households face more risk than households where both
spouses work. The young might face more income uncertainty, or be more impa-
tient than the middle-aged because do not yet perceive the need to accumulate for
old age. In Italian regions with better functioning credit and insurance markets
(the North and the Center), employment shocks and other risks are more likely
to be insured. And in the case of education, we have hard evidence with the same
dataset that income risk differs by level of education.
To check if buffer stock behavior characterizes some population groups, in
Table 4 we present estimates of θ splitting the sample by age (less than 30, between
30 and 40, between 40 and 50), number of income earners, employment status,
business ownership, and region of residence. In the first column θˆ never exceeds
0.02, confirming the full sample estimates for each of the group considered. The
θˆ are precisely estimated, and in each case we reject the hypothesis that they
are consistent with the simulated covariance ratio. The estimates for different
definitions of cash on hand do not change the pattern of results.
Recent work on the extent of precautionary motive for saving has focused
on business owners. Business owners and entrepreneurs face higher income risk,
but their wealth holdings are also higher than average. Hurst, Lusardi, Kennick-
ell, and Torralba (2005) provide evidence that tests of precautionary saving are
considerably affected by the treatment of entrepreneurs. In the total sample, they
find a strong, positive relation between wealth and permanent income shocks,
as in Carroll and Samwick (1997). But the result is almost entirely due to busi-
ness owners: when these are excluded from the sample, there is hardly evidence
for precautionary saving. Table 4 reports θˆ distinguishing by entrepreneurship,
defined as positive business wealth. The results are again at variance with the
buffer-stock model for both groups. We also find a lower value of θˆ in the group
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with lower education, but the point estimates are again far away from the simu-
lated values. Different definitions of cash on hand do not change appreciably the
pattern of results for each of the sample splits considered.
4.3. Impatience
The rate of time preference is a critical parameter of models of intertemporal
choice, but microeconomic data seldom allow to pin down particular features
of this and other preference parameters. The 2000 SHIW attempts at provid-
ing data on time preference through a lottery question. Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue (2002) survey theoretical and empirical research on time pref-
erences, and classify the various methods by elicitation methodology (choice,
matching, rating or pricing), type of instrument used to elicit preferences (field
versus experiment), and time frame (less than one day to many years). They report
that a widely used way to elicit the rate of time preference is through survey ques-
tions asking the respondent to report how much he or she is willing the pay to
receive a lottery winnings today instead of later in time. The 2000 SHIW has
precisely such a question: “Suppose that you win 5,000, payable for certain in
a year’s time. What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay to have
the 5,000 immediately?”
The question is asked only to half of the sample (household heads born in
odd-numbered years), and about 15% don’t answer it. The 2000 data can be
merged with 2002 and 2004 data using the panel component of SHIW (1,749
households are interviewed in 2000, 2002, and 2004). After merging the data, and
considering that we select individuals less than 50 years old in 2002, we are left
with 797 valid observations with data on both target wealth and time preference.
On average, to cash the lottery one year in advance, respondents are willing
to pay 150, implying a quite standard rate of time preference of 3%. Several
studies use questions similar to this, as documented in Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue (2002), who also reviews pros and cons of various methods for
eliciting time preference.11
We therefore split the sample according to whether the rate of time preference
is above or below 3%. Table 5 reports θˆ in the two sub-samples. It is important
to keep in mind that in this case we have a limited number of observations. For
λ < 0.75, the θˆ for the high impatience group is higher for all measures of cash-
on-hand. However, buffer stock behavior is rejected in both groups, as θˆ ranges
between 1.1% and 2.5%.
11. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) emphasize that measurement of time pref-
erence can be affected by confounding factors, such as uncertainty, intertemporal arbitrage, and
consumption smoothing.
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Table 5. Estimated covariance ratio: sample splits by rate of time preference.
Y + λWr + Wf Number of
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.25 observations
High impatience 0.011 0.014 0.020 0.025
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 188
Low impatience 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.011
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 609
Notes: The sample slits are based on a question in the 2000 SHIW asking the respondent to report how much he or
she is willing to pay to receive a lottery winnings today instead of later in time. “High” and “Low impatience” refer
to values of the reported rate of time preference greater or lower than 3%. Observations for 2000 are then merged with
data from 2002–2004, and estimation is performed on the resulting pooled data. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and
financial wealth, Y is disposable income, and λ is the share of real assets that can be used in the current period to finance
consumption. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
4.4. Panel Estimates
In Section 2.1 we stress that the covariance ratio θ can be obtained by the cross-
sectional regression ch = η+θxh +uh. Any valid estimation of such an equation
requires instruments that are correlated with x but uncorrelated with c, except
through their effect on x. Indeed, our framework posits that the wealth gap (xh −
x∗h) provides such an instrument. In the buffer-stock model, the only reasons
why the wealth gap might differ across consumers are the history of household-
specific shocks, and the parameters determining target wealth (risk aversion, rate
of time preference relative to the interest rate, growth rate of income, and standard
deviation of permanent income shocks).
In practice, however, one cannot rule out that there is some systematic rela-
tionship between the error term in consumption and what people report about their
target wealth. As an example, suppose that some households are patient and have
larger target wealth than others, and that it takes them longer to reach their target
wealth than impatient consumers. Then during the transition period following
an income shock one would observe that households with large negative values
of the wealth gap (the patient ones) consume less. More generally, any omitted
variable might lead to biased estimates of θ .
To address the potential source of bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity,
we can rely on the panel section of the SHIW. A total of 4,408 households were
interviewed in 2002 and 2004, providing data on all the relevant variables in two
time periods. Excluding households where the head is older than 50 years, results
in a two-year panel of 1,087 households for a total of 2,174 observations.
The first row of Table 6 reports fixed effect IV estimates of ch using (xh−x∗h)
as instrument for xh. In the total sample θˆ = 0.007. The parameter is precisely
estimated and even lower than the cross-sectional estimate. The other cells of the
table report θˆ for various definitions of wealth. Overall, the panel results suggest
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Table 6. Estimated covariance ratio: sensitivity checks.
Y + λWr + Wf Number of
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.25 observations
IV fixed effect 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 2,174
Permanent income −0.001 −0.003 −0.004 −0.006
(2000–2004 average) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 1,601
Consumption 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.017
includes durables (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 5,911
Notes: The table reports the estimated covariance ratio obtained, in turn, as fixed effect IV estimate in the 2002–
2004 panel; using the 2000–2004 panel to estimate permanent income; adopting the definition of consumption including
durables. Wr and Wf are, respectively, real and financial wealth, Y is disposable income, and λ is the share of real assets
that can be used in the current period to finance consumption. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
that, if any bias exists, it cannot explain rejection of the model obtained in the
absence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the instrument.
Panel data also offer the opportunity to test model predictions that do not
depend on the target wealth variable directly. Under the buffer stock model, low
wealth households hit by negative income shocks should save and high wealth
households dissave. Accordingly, we compute median change in cash-on-hand
for poor and rich households. In our sample median saving is positive in both
groups ( 4,000 and 6,482, respectively).12 Although it is hard to draw inference
with a two-year panel, this represents further evidence against the buffer-stock
model.
4.5. Further Sensitivity Checks
Our measure of permanent income, which we use to normalize cash-on-hand, con-
sumption, and target wealth, is obtained through cross-sectional regressions, and
may not be purged from transitory components. In the second row of Table 6 we
report the estimated covariance ratio using an alternative measure, obtained aver-
aging household disposable income (net of financial income) over time. Averaging
should remove income components that are purely transitory and mean-reverting.
This measure can only be computed for the panel section of the SHIW. Accord-
ingly, we report estimates using the panel section of the last three surveys (2000,
2002, and 2004). The drawback is that the number of observations is consider-
ably reduced and that the evolution of income in the short time period covered by
the panel is a function of shocks that arrived during that period. In practice, the
estimated covariance ratio appears to be very similar.
12. Poor households have less than 10,000 in cash-on-hand, and rich more than 60,000.
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All our tests have been conducted defining consumption as non-durable
expenditure. SHIW has also data on expenditures on durable goods, and therefore
we can use total expenditure as an alternative measure of consumption. As shown
in the last row of Table 6, the results barely change.
4.6. Measurement Error
In our baseline estimates of Table 4 we estimate a covariance ratio of 0.012, to be
contrasted with a simulated value of 0.62. Can measurement error account for such
a large difference between the theoretical benchmark and empirical estimates?
To explore the robustness of our findings in the presence of measurement error,
suppose that consumption, cash on hand and target wealth are all measured with
error:
c˜h = ch + εch, x˜h = xh + εxh, x˜∗h = x∗h + εx
∗
h ,
where tilded variables are observed, untilded are true, unobserved values, and εkh
is a measurement error in variable k having mean zero. Under the assumptions that
the errors are uncorrelated with each other and with true consumption, cash-on-
hand and target wealth, one can show that the probability limit of our IV estimator
of θ is
θ(ν, ξ) = plim θˆ = θ
(
1 − ν − ξ
1 − ξ
)
< θ,
where ν is the percent variation in measured cash on hand explained by mea-
surement error, and ξ = σx˜x˜∗/σ 2x˜ . The expression shows that in the presence of
measurement error our estimator can be indeed downward-biased. Thus, one could
reject the buffer-stock model even when the model is true, at least in principle.
To establish how large should measurement error be in order to reconcile
our results with the buffer-stock model, we plot the probability limit of θˆ as a
function of ν and compare it with θˆ . As long as the probability limit of θˆ is larger
than estimated θˆ , measurement error cannot account for the model rejection. To
compute the probability limit of θˆ we set θ to its baseline simulated value (0.62),
and note that ξ can be obtained as the slope coefficient in the OLS regression of
x˜∗h on x˜h, which we find to be 0.0349.
In Figure 4 we plot the estimated covariance ratio (the horizontal line θˆ =
0.012) and the probability limit of θˆ against measurement error ν. The figure
shows that only for very large values of ν the probability limit of θˆ falls below θˆ :
that is, measurement error leads to false rejection of the buffer-stock model only
if ν > 0.95. In other words, only extremely large measurement error in wealth
can possibly make θˆ = 0.012 consistent with buffer-stock behavior. Because the
reliability index of income and wealth in the SHIW exceeds 80%, it is extremely
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Figure 4. The effect of measurement error in the estimated covariance ratio. The dashed line is the
estimated covariance ratio (θˆ = 0.012) from the total sample regression in Table 4 with cash on
hand defined as Y + Wr + Wf . The continuous line is the probability limit of θˆ as function of ν, the
percent variation in measured cash on hand explained by measurement error. The probability limit
is computed setting θ = 0.623 and ξ = 0.0349.
unlikely that measurement error invalidates our test, regardless of the wealth
definitions.13
5. The Wealth–Income Ratio of Young Households
The version of the buffer-stock model that we analyze is one with impatient
consumers, uncertainty about future earnings, and no borrowing constraints. If
such consumers are sufficiently prudent and expect their earnings to grow over
time, they will never borrow and keep their consumption within their current
incomes, thus inducing “tracking” between consumption and income. In other
versions of the buffer-stock model, impatient consumers would like to borrow
but are prevented to do so because of credit market imperfections, as in Deaton
(1991). The implications for the behavior of consumption and wealth are similar,
however, and “consumption is smoothed, not over the whole life-cycle, but over
13. Biancotti, D’Alessio, and Neri (2004) give extensive account of the quality of the main vari-
ables in SHIW. Exploiting the panel section of the survey, they compute the reliability index for a
broad range of variables. The index is the fraction of total variability of the measured characteristic
accounted by its true variability.
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much shorter periods of a few years at a time” (Deaton 2005, p. 103). In the
literature, this is often referred to as “high-frequency” smoothing of income, as
opposed to the “low-frequency” or “life-cycle frequency” smoothing that was
postulated by Modigliani and Brumberg (see Browning and Crossley 2001).
Tracking of income and consumption and buffer stock behavior stand in sharp
contrast with one of the most important implications of the life-cycle hypothe-
sis, according to which young people save for post-retirement expenditures, and
accumulate wealth up to retirement. In the certainty version the model, the wealth
to permanent income ratio increases during the working span, target wealth to
permanent income ratio is reached at retirement age, and the consumption and
income profiles are completely detached. If income is expected to increase over
the working life, consumers borrow early in life, and start accumulating wealth
only when debt is repaid, which might be even after several years of work, depend-
ing on preferences and the growth rate of individual incomes (Hubbard and Judd
1986).
In a more sophisticated version of the life-cycle model with income risk
and life uncertainty, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) show that sufficiently
patient consumers save even earlier in life. In these life-cycle models with income
risk, uncertainty generates a demand for precautionary saving during the working
span. But, as noted by Modigliani (1986), cash on hand can serve the double
purpose of providing resources for retirement and a buffer against unexpected
emergencies.
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) results fall in between these two polar cases.
They estimate that the behavior of young consumers exhibits buffer-stock behav-
ior, at least in the United States. These consumers would like to borrow but cannot,
or are too prudent to borrow. One way or another, their consumption tracks income
closely and the wealth-income ratio is approximately constant. Once consumers
reach middle-age, however, they follow the standard life-cycle model and the
wealth–income ratio increases until retirement. Similar tracking of income and
consumption arises in models with hyperbolic discounting, see Laibson, Repetto,
and Tobacman (1998).14 The age profile of the wealth–income ratio of working
age consumers provides therefore a useful avenue to distinguish different classes
of models of intertemporal choice.
In the previous section we established that Italian wealth data are at variance
with the buffer stock model. Even though we select a sample where buffer stock
behavior is most likely to arise (individuals aged 20 to 50, or individuals with
relatively high rates of time preference), we do not find evidence that deviations of
wealth from target are offset by changes in consumption. What then explains the
14. The composition of wealth, however, differs between models with exponential and hyper-
bolic discounting, because hyperbolic consumers hold a smaller share of assets in liquid form, see
Angeletos et al. (2001).
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Figure 5. The age profile of the median wealth–income ratio. The two graphs on the left report the
median wealth–income ratio of selected cohorts using the 1989–2002 SHIW. We use two definitions
of wealth: the broad definition is Y + Wr + Wf , and the narrow definition is Y + 0.25Wr + Wf .
The two graphs on the right report the estimated age profiles, obtained by regressions of the wealth-
income ratio on age dummies, cohort dummies, and restricted year dummies summing to zero and
orthogonal to a time trend.
saving decisions of young households? To provide further evidence of the validity
of the buffer stock model, we estimate the age profile of the wealth-income ratio
with seven SHIW waves, running from 1989 to 2002 (almost 60,000 households).
To account for the fact that some of the wealth is illiquid and cannot be used for
precautionary purposes, we use two definitions of x = (Wf +λWr +Y )/P , with
λ = 0.25 and λ = 1.
We sort the data by the year of birth of the head of the household. The first
cohort includes all households whose head was born in 1939 (50 years old in
1989, the year of the first survey). The second includes those born in 1940, and
so on up to the last cohort, which includes those born in 1980 (22 years old in
2002, the last year). As with other survey data, the distribution of x is skewed.
We therefore report only results for the median ratio; results for the 25th and 75th
percentiles exhibit similar patterns.
The left graphs in Figure 5 offer important insights into the process of wealth
accumulation of young Italian households. To make the graphs more readable,
we plot x for selected cohorts. The numbers in the graph refer to the year of birth,
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from 50 (individuals born in 1950) to 65 (individuals born in 1965). Except for
the youngest and the oldest generations, each cohort is observed at seven different
points in times, one for each cross-section. As said, the cross-sections run from
1989 to 2002. Thus, each generation is observed for 13 years with each line being
broken (for instance, cohort 60 is sampled 7 times from age 29 in 1989 to age 42
in 2002). The x ratio is potentially affected by age, cohort, and time effects.
To estimate the age profile of x, we use 203 age/year/cohort cells and proceed
as Deaton and Paxson (1994), regressing x on age dummies, cohort dummies,
and restricted year dummies, summing to zero and orthogonal to a time trend.15
Given the structure of our sample, the regressors include 28 age dummies (from
age 22 to age 50), 41 cohort dummies (from 1939 to 1980), a set of restricted time
dummies, and a constant term. The estimated age dummies can be interpreted as
an individual age-wealth profile, purged from cohort effects. They are plotted on
the right-hand side of Figure 5.
Using the broad definition of cash-on-hand (λ = 1), between age 20 and 50
there is a three-fold increase in x (from 2 to 6); using a narrow definition (λ = 0),
a two-fold increase (from 1.5 to 3). Overall, the graphs suggest that models in
which consumption and income of young households track each other closely
are not an adequate description of the behavior of Italian households. Rather,
consumers start saving early in life, and accumulate assets at the rate of around
10% of their income, or 3,000 per year.16
6. Conclusions
Intertemporal models with liquidity constraints, income risk, and impatience
emphasize that consumers use savings to buffer income fluctuations. These mod-
els deliver a stationary distribution of the ratio of target wealth to permanent
income. When actual wealth, relative to income, is below the optimal target, con-
sumers try to increase their saving. When wealth is above target, they increase
consumption. This important implication of the buffer-stock model has not been
subject to direct empirical testing.
We derive from the model an appropriate theoretical restriction and test it
using data drawn from the 2002 and 2004 SHIW. One of the most appealing
features of these surveys is that people report the amount of wealth held for
15. An alternative identification assumption is to express the ratio as a function of age dummies
and unrestricted time dummies (eliminating cohorts effects). This alternative decomposition delivers
qualitative similar results, for example, an increasing x during the early part of the life-cycle. Both
normalizations rule out time-age or time-cohort interaction terms.
16. Because wealth accumulation does not depend only on age and cohort, we also experiment
adding to the basic regression household size and composition, a dummy for retirement, education,
gender, and region of residence. The qualitative results of increasing wealth-income ratio in Figure
4 is unchanged.
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precautionary purposes, which we interpret as target wealth in the buffer-stock
model. The test results do not support buffer-stock behavior, even among popula-
tion groups that are more likely, a priori, to display such behavior (the young and
the self-employed). Unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error in target
wealth or consumption are unlikely to explain the model’s failure.
Our test rejects the buffer-stock model, but cannot necessarily be interpreted
as suggesting that alternative consumption theories are valid. In the final part of
the paper we therefore use estimates of the age-wealth profile obtained with Italian
repeated cross-sectional data to provide further evidence on the validity of the
buffer-stock model. Indeed, the model predicts that for the young consumption
tracks income closely and that the wealth–income ratio is approximately constant.
In fact, we find that the wealth–income ratio of young Italian households increases
substantially with age.
Overall, the saving behavior of young households in our data is hard to rec-
oncile with models predicting a close parallel between consumption and income,
such as hyperbolic discounting and preference reversal models. The evidence is
instead consistent with models in which impatience, relative to prudence, is not as
high as in buffer stock models, and with models where life-cycle considerations
(such as saving for home purchase or for retirement) are of paramount importance
to understand the behaviour of the young.
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